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[L. A. No. 23743. In Bank. Feb. 19, 1957.]

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO GAS
AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Franchises-Charges and Percentages-System-wide Computation.-The rationale of system-wide computation and apportionment in determining the amount due from a utility for
franchises granted under the Broughton Act (Pub. Util. Code,
§§ 6001-6017) is based on two premises: a utility's gross receipts are produced by all of its operative property; and when
operative properties are integrated and employed as a unit
and the production of receipts by one part of the property
is dependent on or contributes to the production of receipts
by the other parts, the receipts produced by each part cannot be identified specifically and the total receipts must therefore be apportioned among the various properties according to
the factors that produce them.
[2] ld.-Charges and Percentages-System-wide Computation.The exceptional situation in which apportionment by formula
is not necessary under the Broughton Act (Pub. Util. Code,
§§ 6001-6017) is one in which one franchise is used solely and
exclusively in serving the community that granted the franchise and no other.
[3a,3b] ld.-Charges and Percentages-System-wide Computation.
-A gas and electric company serving a county and several
municipalities within the county operated its property as a
unit and as an interdependent whole so that, for the purpose
of ascertaining the amount due under franchises granted by
the county pursuant to the Broughton Act (Pub. Util. Code,
§§ 6001-6017, it had to compute its payments to the county on
a system-wide basis, where production of receipts in the county

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Franchises, § 24.
HeX. Dig. References: [1-4) Franchises, § 21.
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was completely dependent on the use of city facilities, where
the same lines that carried gas and electricity to city con.
sumers were extended into the county to supply consumen
there, and where general plant and office facilities in the city
contributed to an indeterminate extent to the production of
county receipts, and such receipts in turn contributed to the
maintenance of such plant and facilities.
[4] Id.-Charges a.nd Percentages-Property Aifected.-A utility's
business which is unitary in character for the purpose of determining what part of its total receipts, including county
receipts, are attributable to its operative property in a city
does not lose its unitary character when it is necessary to de·
termine what part of its total receipts are attributable to
operative property in the county, since its business cannot
be, for purposes of the Broughton Act (Pub. Uti!. Code,
§§ 6001-6017), both unitary and nonunitary.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. C. A. Paulsen, Judge.- Reversed with direc·
tions.
Action for declaratory relief and for an accounting. Judg.
ment for defendant reversed with directions.
James Don Keller, District Attorney, and Duape J. Carnes,
Deputy District Attorney, for Appellant.
Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps, Chickering & Gregory,
Edgar A. Luce, Walter C. Fox, Jr., and James L. Focht, Jr.,
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 28,1952, the county of San
Diego filed an action for declaratory relief and an accounting
for monies claimed to be due for the years 1947 to 1951, inclusive, for franchises granted by the county to defendant
under the Broughton Act (Pub. Utn. Code, §§ 6001-6017).
That act fixed the payments at " . . . two percent (2%) of
the gross annual receipts of the grantee arising from the
use, operation, or possession of the franchise."
Defendant serves all of San Diego County including sev·
eral municipalities. It has two franchises from the county,
one for electric lines and one for gas lines. It also holds
franchises granted by the several municipalities.
Among the munieipalities served by defendant are the
,
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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,.ities of San Diego, Coronado, and National City. These
three cities are contiguous and for the purposes of this opinion
lin' considered as one.
lkfl'udant computed its payments to the county in the
fullowing manner: (1) it determined its gross receipts from
th ... l'Ountr alone, excluding all receipts from city consumers;
;::!) it apportioned county receipts between distribution propt'rty and all other operative property by means of an "in\,<,,;'l111('nt factor," a percentage figure derived by dividing
the value of investment in distribution property in both the
rity and county by the value of total investment in all operath'e property in both the city and county; (3) it apportioned
the part of gross receipts thus attributed to distribution
property between public and private rights of way according
to the number of miles of each in the county.
The trial court found that the method used by defendant
in its computation was correct, and therefore entered judgment for defendant. The county appeals,
The county contends that defendant's facilities are operated as a unit and that receipts of the entire system should
therefore be included in the computation and apportioned
among the various franchises by the method approved in
prior decisions of this court. (Oounty of Tulare v. Oity of
Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 P. 983]; Oity of 'San Diego v.
Southern Oalif. Tel. Oorp., 42 CaUd 110 [266 P.2d 14] ;
County of Los Angeles v.Southern Oounties Gas 00., 42
Ca1.2d 129 [266 P.2d 27] ; see also Oounty of Tulare v. Oity
of Dinuba, 87 Cal.App. 744 [263 P. 249].) The county also
urges that even if city receipts are to be segregated from
defendant's total receipts, county receipts should likewise
be so segregated, but that defendant does not consistently
maintain such segregation, for it allocates part of the county
receipts to the city by applying in its apportionment between distribution property and other operative property an
.. investment factor" that reflects the value of investment
in plant in both the city and county.
The basic question presented is whether receipts from defendant's entire system should be included in the computation of payments due the county, or whether defendant can
identify the gross receipts produced by its city property by
treating its county and city operations as separate and distinct from each other and exclude that portion of its gross
receipts from the-computation of payments due the county.

)

i
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[1] Th(' answ('r to this question is to be found in the
rationale of s~·stem.wide ('omputation and apportionment in
the cases preyiousl~' cited. This rationale is based on two
premises. A utility's gross receipts are produced by all of
its operativc property. (City of San Diego v. Southern Calif.
Tel. Corp., supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 123-124; County of Los An.
geles v. SOllthcnl Counties Gas Co., supra, 42 Ca1.2d at
133, 136.) When operative properties are integrated and em·
ployed in a business as a unit and the production of receipts
by one part of the property is dependent upon or contributes
to the production of receipts by the other parts, the receipts
produced by each part cannot be identified specifically and
the total receipts must therefore be apportioned among the
various properties according to the factors that produce them.
(County of Tulare y. City of Dinuba, supra, 188 Cal. at 674,
678, 682; City of San Diego v. Southern CaUf. Tel. Corp.,
supra, 42 Cnl.::?d at 124; County of Los Angeles v. Southern
Counties Ga,~ Co., Sllpra, 42 Ca1.2d at 133-136; see also Under·
wood Typcwriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 [41
S.Ot. 45, 65 L.Ed. 165] ; State R(JII,1road Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575,
608 [23 L.Ed. 663].)1
It is true that in the Dinuba case it was recognized that
apportionment by formula might not be necessary in every
situation. It was said: "We have adopted this appropria.
tion, to the \'8rious rights of way, according to mileage, not
necessarily as an exclusive method of distribution of the
gross rec;ipts. but as a practicable one where the contribu.
tion of the '\Grious franchise easements to the gross earnings
cannot be otherwise determined. There may be portions of
the distributing system where the entire transmission from
the producing plant to the consumer is supplied through a
given fralwl:ise. or is entirely supplied over private easements. Sudl farnings would inure to such specific fr:mchises
or easements. . . . But where, as will often happen, contribution to the ,,~rnings of the various rights of way is general
and indistil:pi~hable, we can see no reason why the propor·
tionate mil,'";,:,, basis should not be used in apportioning the
statutory p":-,:,cntage of gross receipts." (188 Cal. at 681-682.)
'Similar rr~::;:~ are applied in the cases arising under the California
Bank and ('(\:;":~::"!l Franchise Tax Act now found in part 11 (~§ 23001
et seq.) of tt< Ec.,,::;;~·and 'Taxation Code. (See Butler Brothers v. Mc·
Colgan, I. 0.;:"::':' f.i4 [111 P.2d 334]; Edison Calif, Stores v, McColgan,
30 CaJ.~d 47:: _:~;:: P.:!d 16]; John Deere Plow Co. v. Fro,nchise Xa:t:
Board, 38 u..:..::.i ::H [238 P.2d 569].)
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The exceptional situation contemplated by that statement,
however, is more fully explained by another statement in
the opinion: "If the electric plant is all within the borders
of a single municipality and entirely distributed from transmission lines covered by the franchise no complications can
arise. The entire proportion of the earnings attributable to
the transmission and delivery of electricity belongs to the
(.!ross receipts from which the two per cent shall be paid.
Immediately the operation of the business passes such limitation the complications begin, if we treat the separate franchises as controlling the income from all electricity passing
through the part of the system covered by such franchise. . . . " (188 Cal. at 675.) [2] In other words, the exceptional situation in which apportionment by formula is
not necessary is one in which one franchise is used solely
and exclusively in serving the community that granted the
franchise and no other. The Dinuba case expressly recognized
"[t]he absurdity of the position that any integral part of
an electric distributing system . . . is entitled to credit for
the whole of the earnings from deliveries and sales in a given
county or municipality when a large part of such service
is over parts of the system not subject to such· franchise or
permit. . . . " (188 Cal. at 674.)
Weare thus brought to the question whether defendant
operates its property on a system-wide basis or whether its
city and county operations are so separate and distinct that
the receipts of one are not dependent upon or contributed
to by the other.
During the years in question 2 defendant operated what
is described as a radial system. The bulk of its administrative facilities and most of its production plant were within
the city. Its distribution lines originated in the city and
extended outward into the county. All of the gas and electricity used in the city were produced and distributed therein.
Many county consumers were also served by the lines originating in the city with gas and electricity produced in the
city.
·On November 1,1949, the company started importing gas over county
rights of way for use in the city. After the commencement. of this
action the company made supplemental payments to the county for
use of the gas francl}il!e for the last two months of 1949 and for the
years 1950 and 1951, basing those paymentA on a computation that in('Iudes receipts from its entire system. The dispute as to the gas
franchise is therefore limited to the payments for 1947, 1948, and the
first ten months of 1949.

30
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[SaJ The conclusion is inescapable that defendant's operative property, including its franchises, is integrated and
operated as an interdependent whole. Defendant itself has
recognized the unitary nature of its business, for in apportioning county receipts between distribution property and
other operative property it has used an "investment factor"
reflecting the value of investment in the entire system. Moreover, the production of receipts in the county is completely
dependent upon the use of city facilities. The same lines that
carry gas and electricity to city consumers are extended into
the county to supply consumers there. General plant and
office facilities in the city contribute to an indeterminate
extent to the production of county receipts (City of San
Diego v. Southern Calif. Tel. Corp., supra, 42 Ca1.2d at 122),
and such receipts in turn contribute to the maintenance of
such plant and facilities. Thus there can be no doubt that
defendant's business must be regarded as unitary to determine what part of its total receipts, including county receipts, are attributable to its operative property in the city.
[4J Since it is unquestionably unitary for that purpose, it
does not lose its unitary character when it is necessary to
determine what part of its total receipts are attributable
to operative property in the county, for its business cannot
be, for purposes of the Broughton Act, both unitary and
nonunitary at the same time. As was said in County of
Tulare v. City of Dinuba, supra, " . . . the purpose of the act
was to impose only a two per cent charge upon the gross
receipts arising from the entire franchise rights enjoyed in
all the highways covered by the system, whether in one or
several counties or municipalities. When the company or
corporation has paid two per cent of all its earnings properly
attributable to all its franchises whether covering one or more
counties, it has fulfilled its obligation. It, of conrse, cannot
concern such corporation how this amount is distributed to
the various municipalities, so long as it is released from
further liability. . . . " (188 Cal. at 675.)
[SbJ We conclude therefore that since defendant's business is a unitary one and its county and city operations are
integrated rather.Jlban separate and distinct from each other,
defendant must'compute its payments to the county on a
system-wide basis in accord with established principles governing such computation. (County of Los Angeles v. Southern
C01mties Gas Co., supra, and cases cited.)
The judgment is reversed for a recomputation of the dis-
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puted payments in conformity with the views expressed in
this opinion.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter J., and Spence, J., eon,·urred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I agree with the reasoning in the
opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard for the
District Court of Appeal in County of San Diego v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (Cal.App), 299 P.2d 664.

)

Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent'a petition for a rehearing was denied March
1957. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted..
~O,
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